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Executive Summary 
During the last six years, U.S.-Israel relations have come under increasing strain and pressure. 
Structural changes in the strategic environment facing both countries, as well as differences in 
the worldviews and leadership styles of American and Israeli leaders, have led to rare public 
discord. As of May 2016, the bilateral U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, the highest formal level of 
coordination between the two countries, has not been held since September 2014. The current 
turbulence in U.S.-Israel relations, however, should be viewed within the broader context of the 
U.S.-Israel “special relationship.” While tactical differences between the United States and Israel 
have emerged in the past, the two allies have managed to find ways to work closely toward a 
greater alignment on shared security and strategic goals. The purpose of this paper is to 
determine for the incoming U.S. administration whether there is a need for a future U.S.-Israel 
security dialogue to address current policy gaps, with special emphasis on enhancing cooperation 
to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthen nonproliferation 
norms, and prepare for regional security emerging threats.  
The paper will present the results of a scoping study conducted by the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWSMD) assessing the desirability, feasibility, and scope of a 
U.S.-Israel security dialogue to be implemented after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The 
project team conducted in-depth consultations with over 30 serving U.S. and Israeli government 
officials and experts, including a research trip to Israel on March 16-17, 2016.  
The CNS-CSWMD project team included Dr. Chen Kane, Director of the Middle East 
Nonproliferation Program at the CNS Washington, DC, office, Dr. W. Seth Carus, Distinguished 
Research Fellow at CSWMD, and Mr. Nima Gerami, Research Fellow at CSWMD.  
It was clear from the interviews conducted during this project that both the American and Israeli 
sides see value in conducting a bilateral security dialogue, preferably at a Track 1.5 (quasi-
official) level. Many Israeli officials and experts expressed interest in holding such a dialogue as 
a means to restore trust and strengthen U.S.-Israel relations following the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, regardless of who is elected. 
In addition, both the American and Israeli sides identified the need for the support and loose 
sponsorship of their respective governments to provide legitimacy and seriousness to the 
dialogue. At the same time, many Americans and Israelis interviewed believed that in order to be 
productive, senior government officials should be present at the initiation of the dialogue, and 
presented with its written products, but should not be present during the discussions themselves. 
Israeli officials and experts also emphasized the importance of a continuous dialogue, rather than 
a one-time event, as an essential element to rebuild trust between the United States and Israel, as 
well as to allow subsequent discussions on sensitive national security issues.   
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The scope of a future U.S.-Israel security dialogue was identified as well. Both the American and 
Israeli sides identified specific topics that they believed would be important to explore in a 
dialogue in support of the formal U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue process. These topics fall under 
three broad categories: (1) regional threat landscape; (2) state actors of proliferation concern; and 
(3) the role and rise of non-state or sub-state actors. Each side also identified topics that they 
would not want to discuss in a future security dialogue, or at least not in the initial phase. These 
topics are further addressed in the paper.  
Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the leading research center 
in Israel, agreed to partner with CNS-CWSMD to host a future U.S.-Israel security dialogue.  
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Background 
Under U.S. President Ronald Reagan, Israel became a strategic partner and a de facto ally of the 
United States. On November 30, 1981, the United States and Israel signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on strategic cooperation, which coincided with the official visit to the 
United States of Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Shamir.  
The 1981 U.S.-Israel MOU established a framework for consultation and cooperation to enhance 
the national security of both countries. It created a series of bilateral groups in military, 
economic, and strategic areas, which have been proved central to the bilateral partnership.1 One 
of the three groups, the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG), was originally designed to 
discuss means of countering threats posed by the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East. Over time, greater emphasis was devoted to bilateral concerns regarding the proliferation of 
WMD. In addition, the JPMG coordinated military exercises and security planning between the 
two countries and allowed for the United States to stockpile military equipment in Israel for use 
by U.S. forces in the event of a crisis.  
In January 1987, the United States designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally and in 1988, a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu institutionalizing strategic dialogue between the two countries.2  
The MOA was “designed to provide greater security for Israel against regional missile and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats” and obligated the United States to provide military 
aid in order to enhance Israel’s defensive and deterrent capabilities. A separate agreement, 
signed in October 1998, was designed to defend Israel against direct threats arising from the 
regional deployment of ballistic missiles of intermediate range or greater.3 
Strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel has continued to evolve. For example, 
a hotline has been established between the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense (MOD), joint military exercises are held on a regular basis, a Joint Anti-
Terrorism Working Group has been established with a DOD-MOD dialogue on counterterrorism, 
among other bilateral military and intelligence exchanges. The latest joint military exercise, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), co-chaired by the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense 
and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, is a bi-annual high-level planning forum that 
assists in the initiation of joint military planning, prepositioning of U.S. defense material in Israel, and combined 
exercises with Israeli forces. The Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP), co-chaired by the Director 
General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, is an annual forum that oversees effective implementation of U.S. security assistance to Israel and reviews 
cooperative defense industrial issues. The Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG), co-chaired by the Director 
General of the Israeli Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs, is an annual economic policy dialogue concerned with developing policies that promote a strong and self-
sufficient economy in Israel. 
2 U.S.–Israel Memorandum of Agreement, 1988, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2011-1/Israel.pdf   
3 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and Israel, October 31 and November 12, 
1998, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/120311.pdf  
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“Juniper Cobra,” was held on February 14 -March 9, 2016, and a U.S.-Israel 
Counterproliferation Dialogue took place in early April 2016 under the auspices of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, led by the U.S. Department of State (DOS). In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Energy leads annual meetings with the Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructure, 
Energy, and Water Resources, with participants across multiple agencies from both countries.4 
In 1999, President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak established the Strategic Policy 
Planning Group (SPPG) and the Joint Strategic Planning Committee, senior consultative working 
groups which met every four months to bolster Israel’s defense and deterrence capabilities.5  
Since 2001, a bi-annual Track 1 (official) interagency Strategic Dialogue has replaced the SPPG. 
Its purpose is to discuss long-term issues and includes representatives from the diplomatic, 
defense, and intelligence establishments. Through the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, the two 
countries have engaged in a wide ranging discussion of regional threats, challenges, and 
opportunities. As the threat of WMD proliferation increased in the region in the early 1990s, the 
scope of the Strategic Dialogue began to include issues related to the proliferation and 
counterproliferation of WMD.6 This aspect of the official dialogue has grown increasingly 
important, particularly in the run-up to the July 2015 announcement of a comprehensive nuclear 
agreement between Iran and the P5+1, as well as significant transfers of major conventional 
weapons by the United States as a security assurance to Gulf Arab states.7  
One unique aspect of the U.S.-Israel relationship is the United States’ commitment over the past 
30 years to maintaining Israel’s military superiority over its regional neighbors—a policy known 
as Qualitative Military Edge (QME). This policy is intended to ensure that Israel is able to 
counter and defeat credible conventional military threats from any state or non-state actor, and 
that no other Middle Eastern country—including Gulf Arab states not necessarily hostile to 
Israel—receives advanced technological systems that have not yet been offered to Israel.8 The 
United States’ commitment to preserving Israel’s QME was formalized into law in September 
2008 with the passage of H.R. 7177, commonly known as “The Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 
2008.” Under this legislation, the U.S. president must update the Congress every four years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The U.S.-Israel energy relationship has a statutory underpinning, the Energy Independent and Security Act of 2007 
(42 U.S.C. 17337), which applies to monies appropriated for the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation and 
Binational Industrial R&D Foundation. See http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
1.682289?ts=_1445825678373; http://energy.gov/ia/us-israel-energy-meetings  
5 Joint Statement by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Washington, DC, July 19, 1999, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/mid031.asp  
6 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue,” Washington, DC, September 11, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/231511.htm  
7 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint 
Statement,” May 14, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/annex-us-gulf-cooperation-
council-camp-david-joint-statement; and Ronen Bergman, “Washington is Waiting for Israel’s Demands on Iran,” 
Ynet, May 22, 2015, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4657389,00.html 
8 For the QME definition, see U.S. Senate, H.R. 7177, 110th Congress, 2nd session, September 17, 2008, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr7177rds/pdf/BILLS-110hr7177rds.pdf  
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regarding any and all weapons systems that the United States has sold to the Middle East. As part 
of the maintenance of Israel’s QME, the United States and Israel maintain a constant dialogue 
regarding the preservation of Israel’s relative military advantage, particularly when major arms 
deals are signed between the United States and its Gulf Arab partners.9  
Currently, the United States and Israel are in the midst of a contentious negotiation over a new 
10-year military aid package, which will decide the nature of U.S. security assistance to Israel 
from 2018. Once signed, the MOU will reiterate a longstanding U.S. commitment to maintain 
Israel’s qualitative military edge to deter and defend against its regional adversaries. The gaps 
between the two states are significant, however, and it is possible that the Israeli prime minister 
will seek to postpone the MOU negotiations until after the 2016 U.S. presidential election.10  
As observed by one former senior Israeli official, the gap between the United States and Israel on 
the military aid package is not limited to the final sum on the bottom line. Rather, it is 
symptomatic of the current crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations—the Obama and Netanyahu 
administrations are deeply divided by contrasting assessments of threats in the Middle East and 
the extent to which Israel is considered a strategic asset to the United States.11 Prime Minister 
Netanyahu believes any incoming U.S. administration will change President Obama’s reserved 
stance on the Middle East and take steps to strengthen ties with Israel as an integral part of an 
updated U.S. strategy to confront Iranian subversion, its state sponsorship of terrorism, and its 
nuclear ambitions.12 
The CNS-CSWMD research trip occurred at a particularly turbulent time in U.S.-Israel relations. 
During the last six years, U.S.-Israeli relations have come under increasing strain and pressure.13 
Structural changes in the strategic environment facing both countries, as well as differences in 
the worldviews and leadership styles of American and Israeli leaders, has led to rare public 
discord, particularly in regard to the comprehensive nuclear agreement reached between Iran and 
the P5+1, as well as the dim prospects for reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The 
Israeli prime minister and his closest advisors believe the Iran nuclear agreement and other 
Obama administration policies herald a growing rift between the United States and its traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Qualitative Military Edge, http://militaryedge.org/about/; see also Amos Harel, “Washington, Jerusalem 
Discussing Massive Compensation for Iranian Nuclear Deal,” Haaretz, May 20, 2015, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.657276   
10 Ben Caspit, “Why Bibi Snubbed Obama and is Skipping Next Week’s AIPAC Conference,” Al-Monitor, March 
14, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/israel-netanyahu-official-trip-cancelled-obama-aipac-
us-aid.html#  
11 Amos Yadlin, “Disagreement over Defense Aid: Bridging the Gaps,” INSS Insight No. 818, May 3, 2016, 
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=11773  
12 Ibid. 
13 Michael Steele, “Can U.S.-Israeli Relations Get Any Worse?,” MSNBC News, April 2, 2015, 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/can-us-israeli-relations-get-any-worse; Ian Bremmer, “The U.S. and Israel Are 
Divided—and That Won’t Change,” Time, April 2, 2015, http://time.com/3768165/us-israel-relations-middle-east-
iran-divide/; and Michael B. Oren, “How Obama Abandoned Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-obama-abandoned-israel-1434409772    
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regional allies, a change in U.S. perception of Iran and its role in the region, and a broader policy 
of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East. This perception has been exacerbated by the 
Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia and statements made by President Barack Obama 
suggesting that he does not consider the Middle East to be as important to U.S. national security 
as it once was, especially compared to Asia and the Pacific.14 
Disagreements between the United States and Israel over the key parameters of the July 2015 
nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, disagreement over the parameters of the U.S.-
Israel MOU on maintaining Israel’s QME, as well as the lack of progress on Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks resulted in the halting of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue since September 2014.  
A week before the CNS-CSWMD research trip, on March 8, 2016, U.S. Vice President Joe 
Biden arrived in Israel for a two-day visit to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Vice 
President Biden’s visit was intended to advance the negotiations over the 10-year MOU on U.S. 
military aid to Israel.15 A day before the visit, media reports suggested that Prime Minister 
Netanyahu had abruptly cancelled a meeting with President Obama scheduled later that month in 
Washington, D.C., ostensibly due to unresolved questions over the MOU negotiations.16 In the 
midst of this tension, The Atlantic published in its April 2016 issue a revealing interview with 
President Obama in which he recalled an incident when Prime Minister Netanyahu had lectured 
him on the Middle East, underscoring, yet again, the differences in style and temperament 
between the two leaders that had seeped into the public sphere in recent years.17   
Meetings that took place throughout this study also coincided with growing tumult across the 
region, including a series of Iranian ballistic missile tests that the United States claimed were in 
violation of UN Security Council 2231. The missiles, capable of reaching Israel and the Gulf 
Arab states, were marked with a statement in Hebrew reading “Israel should be wiped off [the 
Earth],” according to Iran’s semi-official Fars News.18 Other regional pressures, including the 
civil and proxy wars in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, and Saudi Arabia’s recent execution of Shi’a 
cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the subsequent attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, have 
opened the door to new destabilizing competition between the Gulf Arab states and Iran. The 
decline of Egypt’s regional influence, Russia’s intervention in Syria, and its March 14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/  
15 According to media reports, Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected Vice President Biden’s call to renew Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks on a two-state solution along 1967 lines and to halt expansion of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank. See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/netanyahu-obama-collective-diplomacy-force-
gap-policeman.html#  
16 Rory Jones and Carol E. Lee, “Netanyahu’s Office Ties Canceled Obama Meeting to Unresolved U.S.-Israel Aid 
Explanation Differs from One Offered Days Ago, Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahus-office-ties-canceled-obama-meeting-to-unresolved-u-s-israel-aid-
1457648041  
17 Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.” 
18 “Iran Fires 2 Ballistic Missiles at Targets 1400 km in Distance,” March 9, 2016, Fars News,  
http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941219000355  
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announcement that it would partially withdraw from Syria have further added to the complexities 
of the Middle East’s delicate and volatile balance of power. 
The current turbulence in U.S.-Israel relations, however, should be viewed in the broader context 
of the U.S.-Israel “special relationship.” While tactical differences have emerged before, the two 
allies have managed in the past to find ways to work closely toward a greater alignment on 
shared security and strategic goals. This project is aimed at finding ways where the United States 
and Israel can enhance cooperation to counter WMD proliferation, strengthen nonproliferation 
norms, and prepare for emerging threats to regional security given the evolving security 
environment in the Middle East. This report conveys key findings and recommendations based 
on consultations with current and former U.S. and Israeli officials by addressing three main 
issues: the desirability, feasibility, and scope of a future U.S.-Israel security dialogue.  
Desirability: Is There a Need for Another U.S.-Israel Security 
Dialogue?  
Sustainable and reliable government-to-government ties are an important component of the 
overall U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship. As opposed to other countries the United States seeks to 
engage diplomatically, U.S.-Israel relations are saturated with dialogues at multiple levels, 
including at the Track 1, 1.5, and 2 levels. In light of this, the underlying question is: is there a 
need for another dialogue to discuss WMD-related issues? If so, what will be its comparative 
advantages, and what gaps would it seek to fill?  
The following section will explore existing Track 1, 1.5, and 2 security dialogues between the 
United States and Israel, and compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of each to 
identify whether another dialogue is necessary.  
Ongoing Track 1 Dialogues  
The highest level of regularly-scheduled diplomatic meetings between the United States and 
Israel is the Strategic Dialogue, a Track 1 (official) dialogue led by American and Israeli 
government officials at the deputy minister level. Most recently, the Strategic Dialogue was led 
on the American side by Deputy Secretary of State and on the Israeli side by the Minister of 
Strategic Affairs. Held on a semi-annual basis, the last U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue took place 
in September 2014 in Washington, D.C. However, due to increased tension between the two 
countries on the Iran nuclear negotiations and Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, as of May 2016, no 
additional Strategic Dialogue meetings have been held. Furthermore, the official dialogue held in 
September 2014 resulted in the uncharacteristic release of separate statements by the two 
governments, while past dialogues invariably produced joint statements on the issues 
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discussed.19 No date has been publicly announced for the next round of discussions; given 
uncertainties within the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs as well as National Security Council, 
it is unclear who will head the Israeli delegation once such a dialogue resumes.  
Additional formal dialogues that include discussion related to the spectrum of countering WMD 
issues—nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management—have continued 
to take place. These include dialogues between the National Security Councils, DOD-MOD, and 
DOS-Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The senior-level dialogue at the National Security 
Advisor level has been less structured than the Strategic Dialogue framework and is more 
personality driven. The DOD-MOD formal dialogues are “too many to track,” according to DOD 
officials. These dialogues cover, among other issues, missile defense, interdiction, 
counterterrorism and intelligence sharing. 
At least two additional bilateral dialogues are led by the U.S. Department of State and the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One such dialogue is led by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Vann Van Diepen, and the other by Assistant Secretary for International Security and 
Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman. In both cases the Israeli counterpart is Jeremy 
Issacharoff, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Other dialogues focused on countering the proliferation of WMD also take place 
between and among the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies and military establishments.  
In early consultations during the initial phase of this study, several current Israeli officials 
maintained that the Track 1 dialogue(s) is robust and were not certain if there was added value in 
conducting an additional dialogue at the Track 1.5 or 2 levels. It should be noted that these 
consultations took place in May 2014, prior to the JCPOA and just after the last April 2014 
Strategic Dialogue. Conversely, a number of former senior Israeli officials who participated in 
the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue overwhelmingly believed there are significant gaps in the 
dialogue process that could be overcome by increased contact between officials and outside 
government experts at a Track 1.5 (quasi-official) or Track 2 (unofficial) dialogue. The highest 
senior Israeli official that was interviewed during the March 2016 trip to Israel also held that 
such a security dialogue could be a means to restore trust and strengthen U.S.-Israel relations 
following the U.S. presidential election, regardless of who is elected.  
While all individuals interviewed for this study agreed that the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue 
should continue, recently retired officials identified several deficiencies in the official dialogue.  
First, according to multiple former senior Israeli officials who participated in recent Strategic 
Dialogue meetings, the dialogue is neither sufficiently robust nor comprehensive. They noted 
that the substance of the dialogue has significantly deteriorated over the last five years and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “U.S., Israel Differ on Emphases in Strategic Dialogue,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 14, 2015,  
http://www.jta.org/2014/09/14/news-opinion/united-states/u-s-israel-differ-in-emphases-in-strategic-dialogue 
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focused primarily on political issues, rather than in-depth discussion of a narrower set of policy 
issues, including medium- and long-term aspects of regional security. One former Israeli official 
went so far as to describe the Strategic Dialogue as merely “ceremonious,” and highlighted the 
need to reinvigorate U.S.-Israel bilateral engagement and cooperation on regional security issues. 
Others similarly noted that the Strategic Dialogue framework has grown increasingly irrelevant 
and needs to be upgraded or improved. According to a former senior Israeli official, previous 
efforts spearheaded by the Israeli NSC to establish a complementary dialogue or improve the 
existing one have been rebuffed by U.S. officials who were dubious about the benefits of 
improving the Strategic Dialogue process.  
Second, one of the problems identified by Israelis interviewed for this study was that the 
Strategic Dialogue has become less effective since the senior Israeli official appointed to lead the 
dialogue has become a political appointee, rather a career civil servant. Media leaks and 
increased politicization have thus undermined credibility of the dialogue.    
Third, regardless of leadership personalities, there has been a growing mistrust between the 
United States and Israel, especially on nonproliferation issues, since 2010. The “singling out of 
Israel” in the final document adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, without explicit 
reference to Iran’s safeguards transgressions, and the establishment of a process for negotiating a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) within the NPT Review Process—in 
contradiction to promises made to Israel by senior U.S. officials prior to the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference—remains a sore point for Israel.20  
Ongoing Track 1.5 and 2 Dialogues  
In parallel with the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, several dialogues take place at the Track 1.5 
and 2 levels. Most notable among these is the U.S.-Israel Track 1.5 dialogue organized until not 
long ago by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss approaches toward Iran’s 
nuclear program. Since this dialogue focused on the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 
P5+1, the group has not convened since the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Many of those who participated in the dialogue noted its utility 
due to the high level of participants involved.  
Also of note is the dialogue co-hosted by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs and Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. This 
dialogue is broad and political in scope, addressing topics ranging from geopolitical trends, 
WMD proliferation, and the Middle East peace process. Due to changes in the individuals that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Statement by the Government of Israel on the NPT Review Conference Middle East Resolution, 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2010, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2010/pages/statement_government_israel_npt_review_conference_29-may-
2010.aspx. See also Jayantha Dhanapala, “Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” USIP Special Report, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR258%20-
%20Evaluating%20the%202010%20NPT%20Review%20Conference.pdf  
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lead the dialogue in both organizations, as well as funding constraints, the dialogue has only 
taken place a handful times since 2000. Another U.S.-Israel Track 2 dialogue, sponsored by 
NPS-PASCC/DTRA, took place in Jerusalem in 2011. This dialogue was a one-time event, and 
the general view of participants involved was that emphasis on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
detracted from serious examination of other security-related issues where more substantive 
progress could have been made, particularly on matters concerning the proliferation of WMD.  
With regard to deficiencies in non-Track 1 dialogues, most Americans and Israelis interviewed 
for this study believed that too few of the existing Track 1.5 or Track 2 activities have been 
conducted to account for the transformation of the Middle East since the 2010-11 Arab uprisings 
and ongoing wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. With the notable exceptions of the 
Washington Institute’s U.S.-Israel dialogue and a broad regional-based (as opposed to bilateral) 
security dialogues conducted by UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development, the general 
impression of those interviewed is that past and existing U.S.-Israel security dialogues  have not 
adequately covered the full spectrum of countering WMD issues and have either broadly focused 
on all topics related to security in the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, or 
otherwise focused too narrowly on a single state actor of proliferation concern, such as Iran.  
CNS-CSWMD project team observed that operational issues related to WMD proliferation and 
counterproliferation such as missile defense, interdiction, and intelligence sharing, as well as 
broad strategic issues, including chemical weapons use in Syria and implementation of the Iran 
nuclear agreement appear to be adequately covered in existing bilateral Track 1 dialogues. 
Two important gaps were identified, however, across all tracks. The first is the lack of 
understanding (and discussions) on the other side’s perspectives and regional interests. The 
second is a discussion on issues in the intersection of strategy and policy—that is, strategic topics 
that bear direct impact on the policy stances of both sides on WMD-related issues to include the 
changing Middle East landscape, the collapse of the state system in many Gulf Arab states, 
extended deterrence, the expansion of civil nuclear power in the Middle East, the persistent use 
of chemical weapons by non-state actors and its implications for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
In sum, based on interviews conducted by the CNS-CSWMD project team, a consensus emerged 
that an additional U.S.-Israel security dialogue could remedy perceived gaps in existing bilateral 
dialogues and serve as a platform for assessing the implications of increasing political turmoil in 
the Middle East, exchanging views on threat perceptions, and identifying further opportunities 
for strengthening U.S.-Israel security cooperation on WMD issues. 
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Feasibility: Can a Productive Bilateral Dialogue on WMD-related 
Issues be Conducted?  
It was clear from those interviewed that a mutually agreed agenda, topics, and participants 
chosen for a future U.S.-Israel security dialogue will need to be handled very carefully. If not 
managed carefully, actions and statements during the dialogue could gradually further erode 
mutual trust between the two allies and the good relations established between officials at the 
working level.  
Officials from both sides, especially Israel, emphasized the erosion of confidence and trust 
between the two countries on WMD-related issues stemming, in part, from the experience of the 
2010 NPT Review Conference. Many Israelis reiterated the traditional stance that WMD arms 
control can only proceed if regional security improves first and underlined the WMDFZ as a 
political non-starter, given the current security situation in the region. They further maintained 
that the 2015 NPT Review Conference was the public coup de grâce of the WMDFZ issue.21 
The most senior Israeli official interviewed indicated willingness to help establish a future U.S.-
Israel security dialogue at the Track 1.5 level, with the understanding that it would occur after 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and focus on conceptual discussions related to preventing 
threats to regional stability. Israeli officials and outside government experts also indicated that, if 
WMD-relevant threats were framed in terms of improving regional security, Israel could be 
interested in such a dialogue as a means to restore trust and strengthen U.S.-Israel relations.  
The following are topics identified by U.S. and Israeli officials and outside government experts 
as potential areas for discussions in a future dialogue. These topics are subject to change 
depending on regional and international developments in the coming year: 
Regional Threat Landscape 
- What are the implications of developments in the regional security environment for U.S. 
and Israeli political-military or strategic doctrines?  
 
- What are current and emerging WMD threats, and how do U.S. and Israeli risk 
assessments differ? How can the two sides best cooperate and coordinate activities to 
address current and emerging WMD threats? 
 
- In what ways do regional conflicts and sectarian tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
affect U.S.-Israel ties, and their respective alliances with Gulf Arab states? How might 
these relationships address current drivers of uncertainty and instability in the Middle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Andrea Berger, “Gangs of New York: The 2015 NPT Revcon, European Leadership Network, May 27, 2015, 
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/gangs-of-new-york-the-2015-npt-revcon_2790.html  
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East as part of a broader regional security process? 
 
- In the aftermath of the Iran nuclear agreement, what opportunities exist for the United 
States and Israel to strengthen nonproliferation norms, particularly in the realm of 
monitoring and verification? In what ways should the United States and Israel plan for 
the next 10-15 years and beyond?  
State Actors of Proliferation Concern 
- How do the foreign policies of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt shape or 
influence proliferation drivers and regional nonproliferation policies?   
 
- In what ways can the United States and Israel drive relationships with the aforementioned 
states to reduce proliferation pressures, mitigate sectarian tensions, and shape a more 
stable and sustainable regional order?  
 
- What is the role of missile defense in sustaining regional deterrence, and how can the 
United States and Israel sustain cooperation in joint missile defense programs? What are 
the implications of other regional states acquiring missile defense capabilities? Is there a 
basis for regional cooperation?   
 
The Role and Rise of Non-State or Sub-State Actors 
- What are the existing and future tools needed to address the potential acquisition and use 
of WMD by non-state actors? What are the possible consequences and implications of the 
large-scale use of chemical weapons in the region by non-state actors?  
 
- What further steps can the United States and Israel take to counter the acquisition and use 
of WMD by Hezbollah, ISIL, and other non-state or sub-state actors?  
 
- What role does the interdiction of WMD and their associated delivery systems play in 
preventing the risks of proliferation?  
Scope: Timing, Participants, and Partner 
Timing. The overall sentiment shared by many of Israelis interviewed for this study was that 
Israel could be interested in conducting a U.S.-Israel security dialogue as a means to restore trust 
and strengthen U.S.-Israel relations following the U.S. presidential election, regardless of who is 
elected. This was widely viewed by current and former Israeli officials as a feasible prospect and 
a potential opportunity to “reset” U.S.-Israel relations by injecting new ideas into discussions 
that could inform or complement the Track I Strategic Dialogue, likely to take place after the 
inauguration of the next U.S. administration on January 20, 2017. 
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Type of dialogue. Most experts interviewed believed that a Track 1.5 would be the ideal setting 
for such a dialogue. In contrast to Track 2 diplomacy, a Track 1.5 dialogue serves the useful role 
of establishing professional ties and personal relations within and across U.S. and Israeli entities 
involved in policymaking. A number of Israelis interviewed independently cited the Forum of 
Strategic Dialogue (FSD), an Israeli NGO that convenes bilateral dialogues between Israeli and 
European government officials and outside government experts, as an exemplary model for a 
future U.S.-Israel security dialogue. Although few bilateral European-Israel security dialogues 
have been conducted at either the Track 2 or Track 1.5 levels, the creation in 2013 of FSD has 
provided an important forum for informal consultations between Israeli and European 
government officials and academics to discuss emerging security issues and to identify priority 
items for bilateral discussion at the Track I level. Notably, FSD does not focus on countering 
WMD issues per se, but its annual bilateral meetings between Israeli and key European 
countries—France, Germany, Poland—has led to important collaboration and strengthened ties 
between European and Israeli research centers and government institutions by encouraging “out-
of-the-box” discussions in the fields of defense, security, foreign affairs, and economy.22 At the 
same time, it would be best to avoid disproportionate senior-level government representation to 
allow for more open and candid discussion.  
Israelis and many Americans believed Track 1.5 would be preferable to Track 2 for a future 
bilateral dialogue, with the important caveat that active senior government participation could 
constrain discussion and therefore senior government officials should be present at the initiation 
of the dialogue, show their support for it and be presented with its written products, but should 
not be present during the discussions themselves. Several former American and Israeli officials 
maintained that the involvement of high-level political appointees could potentially derail the 
dialogue process. A Track 1.5 dialogue was widely viewed as the most impactful.  
Number and type of participants. A future Track 1.5 security dialogue should be limited to no 
more than 15 participants from each side with expertise in U.S.-Israeli diplomacy, Middle East 
policy, WMD counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and broader regional security and defense 
matters. As stated above, a dialogue would preferably be held at the Track 1.5 level over the 
course of 1-2 days to encourage serious participation and provide advice that could inform and 
complement the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue. Ideally, the dialogue should take place more than 
once to incrementally restore confidence and trust and allow for the discussion of more sensitive 
national security topics. 
Whereas the U.S. national security community is relatively broad, in Israel this community is 
limited to a small cadre of experts. Additionally, practitioners of Israeli government bureaucracy 
tend to discount the influence of those that have no official positions. Israeli officials, therefore, 
urged that an effort should be made to identify those outside of government that do have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In 2014, FSD also hosted a NATO-Israel Cooperation event in partnership with NATO. For more background, see 
http://f-sd.eu/about.aspx 
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influence as well as to account for potential asymmetries in U.S. and Israeli participation and 
suggested inviting a broad spectrum of representatives from across the political spectrum. Some 
Israelis also underscored the importance of reaching out to new participants, including mid-level 
government officials and academics, to ensure a dialogue involves fresh voices and has enduring 
impact. 
Should there be a decision to pursue a dialogue after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
participants will have to be carefully selected in consultation with Israeli partners and 
corresponding to the range of topics selected for discussion. Additional participants would be 
invited from other U.S. and Israeli think tanks, representing the broad spectrum of viewpoints in 
both countries. Senior government officials from the United States and Israel offered to serve as 
a keynote or sponsoring role for the dialogue. A senior Israeli official also indicated his 
willingness to help establish a dialogue, with the understanding that it would occur after the U.S. 
elections and focus on conceptual discussions related to preventing threats to regional security. 
Israeli partner. Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the leading 
research center in Israel, agreed to partner with CNS/CWSMD to host such a future dialogue. 
The project team met with the INSS Executive Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin who 
expressed an interest in hosting a dialogue and a desire to discuss issues specifically related 
WMD proliferation and policies. INSS members also suggested that there be a public component 
to the dialogue, including the possibility of a publicly releasable report (aside from a confidential 
report and briefings to senior government officials) and the inclusion of emerging leaders to 
bridge perspectives and foster sustainability.  
 
 
 
